Quantum Game Analysis on Extrinsic Incentive Mechanisms for P2P Services
Quantum Game Analysis on Extrinsic Incentive Mechanisms for P2P Services
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DOI：
10.1109/tpds.2019.2933416
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发表时间：
2020-01
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
Shengling Wang;Weiman Sun;Liran Ma;Weifeng Lv;Xiuzhen Cheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shengling Wang;Weiman Sun;Liran Ma;Weifeng Lv;Xiuzhen Cheng
诸如移动的P2P传输和资源共享之类的对等（P2P）服务提供了在不部署任何中央服务器的情况下递送数据的有效方法。然而，在这些服务中继承的搭便车现象迫切需要激励机制来刺激数据传输或共享的贡献。因此，必须回答以下问题：激励机制是否可以援引这种贡献，如果可以，在何种程度上可以援引这种贡献？为了回答这些问题，我们采用了一个$n$n-局中人的连续量子博弈模型来分析一般的外在激励机制，以及基于声誉的激励机制，一类典型的外在激励机制。本文重点研究了外部激励机制，因为它们通过提供奖励而不是依赖于内部边界（例如，社会联系），这可能并不总是存在于任何对等体对之间。据我们所知，我们是第一个从量子博弈的角度来分析P2P服务的外在激励机制。采用这种观点是因为量子博弈中扩展的策略空间拓宽了搜索最优策略的范围，并且由于考虑了外部激励机制中奖励所施加的对等体关系，纠缠的引入使得所提出的分析框架更具实用性。我们基于量子博弈的分析框架是通用的，因为它与经典的基于博弈的方案兼容。分析结果可以为评价外部激励机制的潜力提供直观的见解，并可作为设计新的外部激励机制的重要参考。
Peer-to-peer (P2P) services such as mobile P2P transmissions and resource sharing, provide efficient methods to deliver data without the deployment of any central server. Nevertheless, the free-riding phenomenon inherit in such services presses a need for incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions of data transmissions or sharing. As a result, it is imperative to answer the following questions: whether, and if so to what extent, an incentive mechanism can invoke such contributions? To answer these questions, we employ an $n$n-player continuous quantum game model to analyze the general extrinsic incentive mechanisms as well as the reputation-based incentive mechanisms, a typical class of extrinsic incentive mechanisms. We focus on studying the extrinsic incentive mechanisms in this paper due to their wide scope of applications stemming from the fact that they promote cooperative behaviors by offering rewards rather than depending on the internal bounds (e.g., social ties) among peers, which may not always exist between any pair of peers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the extrinsic incentive mechanisms for P2P services from a quantum game perspective. Such a perspective is adopted because the extended strategy space in the quantum game broadens the range for searching optimal strategies and the introduction of entanglement makes the proposed analytical frameworks more practical due to the consideration of the peers’ relationships imposed by the rewards in extrinsic incentive mechanisms. Our quantum game-based analytical framework is generic because it is compatible with classic game-based schemes. The analytical results can provide a straightforward insight on evaluating the potential of the extrinsic incentive mechanisms and can serve as important references for designing new extrinsic incentive mechanisms.