Reflection and disagreement
Reflection and disagreement
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x
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发表时间：
2007-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Elga, Adam
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Elga, Adam
你应该如何考虑导师的意见？当你完全听从顾问的判断（她回应证据的方式），那么你应该把顾问当作导师。粗略地说，这意味着你应该相信你认为她会相信的东西，如果有额外的证据的话。当顾问是你未来的自己时，产生的原则相当于反射原则的一个版本——一个经过修改以处理信息丢失情况的版本。当你把导师视为认知上的同辈时，你应该把她的结论和你自己的结论同等重视。否认这种观点——称之为“同等权重观点”——会导致荒谬：荒谬的是，你可以合理地相信自己在认识上比导师优越，只要注意到与她意见相左的案例，并认为她犯了大部分错误。接受这种观点似乎会导致另一种荒谬：一个人应该暂停对他聪明而见多识广的朋友不同意的一切事情的判断，这意味着暂停对几乎所有有趣的事情的判断。但是，尽管表面上看，同等权重的观点并没有产生这种荒谬的后果。此外，这一观点不仅可以推广到认知的同侪，还可以推广到认知的上下级。
How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you rr completely defer to the advisor's judgment (the manner in which she responds to her evidence), then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle-a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own. Denying that view-call it the "equal weight view"-leads to absurdity: the absurdity that you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic superior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her, and taking it that she made most of the mistakes. Accepting the view seems to lead to another absurdity: that one should suspend judgment about everything that one's smart and well-informed friends disagree on, which means suspending judgment about almost everything interesting. But despite appearances, the equal weight view does not have this absurd consequence. Furthermore, the view can be generalized to handle cases involving not just epistemic peers, but also epistemic superiors and inferiors.