Covid-19, Shelter-In Place Strategies and Tipping
Covid-19, Shelter-In Place Strategies and Tipping
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Covid-19、就地避难策略和小费
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Kunreuther
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhihan Cui;G. Heal;H. Kunreuther
通过就地避难策略保持社交距离已成为抗击新冠肺炎最有效的方法。在美国，这些政策的选择是由各州做出的。在这里，我们表明，由一个国家的政策选择的影响，其他国家面临的激励采取类似的政策：他们可以被视为战略互补的超模块化游戏。如果它们满足一致严格增加差异的条件，那么根据Heal和Kunreuther（[6]），我们表明，如果有足够多的国家参与社会距离，它们将提示其他国家也这样做，从而改变纳什均衡关于参与社会距离的国家数量。
Social distancing via shelter-in-place strategies has emerged as the most effective way to combat Covid-19. In the United States, choices about such policies are made by individual states. Here we show that the policy choice made by one state influences the incentives that other states face to adopt similar policies: they can be viewed as strategic complements in a supermodular game. If they satisfy the condition of uniform strict increasing differences then following Heal and Kunreuther ([6]) we show that if enough states engage in social distancing, they will tip others to do the same and thus shift the Nash equilibrium with respect to the number of states engaging in social distancing.