Strategic communication between prospect theoretic agents over a Gaussian test channel
Strategic communication between prospect theoretic agents over a Gaussian test channel
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前景理论代理之间通过高斯测试通道进行战略通信
DOI：
10.1109/milcom.2017.8170821
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Başar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. S. S. Nadendla;E. Akyol;Cédric Langbort;T. Başar
在本文中，我们在一个简单的高斯测试信道中建立了一个Stackelberg博弈模型，其中人类发送者（领导者）将源消息传递给人类接收者（追随者）。我们使用连续决策空间的前景理论模型来模拟人类的决策。假设值函数为发送方和接收方的失真平方，我们分析了发送方和接收方的权函数对最优通信策略（即在发送方进行编码，在接收方进行解码）的影响。我们证明了行为主体在Stackelberg意义上的最优策略与为无偏主体设计的策略是相同的。同时，我们还表明，在发送方和接收方的前景理论扭曲都大于预期扭曲，从而使行为主体比无偏主体竞争更少。因此，认知偏差的存在增加了对发射功率的需求，以便在发射端和接收端实现给定的失真。
In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower). We model human decision making using prospect theory models proposed for continuous decision spaces. Assuming that the value function is the squared distortion at both the transmitter and the receiver, we analyze the effects of the weight functions at both the transmitter and the receiver on optimal communication strategies, namely encoding at the transmitter and decoding at the receiver, in the Stackelberg sense. We show that the optimal strategies for the behavioral agents in the Stackelberg sense are identical to those designed for unbiased agents. At the same time, we also show that the prospect-theoretic distortions at both the transmitter and the receiver are both larger than the expected distortion, thus making behavioral agents less contended than unbiased agents. Consequently, the presence of cognitive biases increases the need for transmission power in order to achieve a given distortion at both transmitter and receiver.