The coevolution of altruism and punishment: Role of the selfish punisher
The coevolution of altruism and punishment: Role of the selfish punisher
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.011
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发表时间：
2006-06-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Iwasa, Yoh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nakamaru, Mayuko;Iwasa, Yoh
惩罚是促进非亲属间利他主义演变的重要机制。我们考察了利他主义和惩罚性行为的共同进化，考虑了四种可能的策略：利他主义惩罚者(AP，惩罚叛逃者的合作者)、利他主义的非惩罚者(AN，纯粹的合作者)、自私的惩罚者(SP，惩罚叛逃者的人)和自私的不惩罚者(SN，纯粹的叛逃者)。SP在惩罚其他叛逃者时使用了一种自相矛盾的策略。我们分析了SP和AN在利他主义和惩罚的协同进化中的作用。我们研究了分数依赖的生存模型(游戏的分数只影响存活率)和分数依赖的生育力模型(分数只影响生育率)。在完全混合种群的生存模型中，SP首先驱逐SN，从而帮助协作者(AP和AN)进化。相比之下，在完全混合人口的生育模型中，SP和AN都不利于合作的演变。在格子结构种群的生存模型和生育模型中，SP促进AP的传播。相比之下，AN阻碍了AP的发展。这些结果可以理解，惩罚是一种恶意行为，付出代价降低对手的适合度，不同的模式赋予恶意行为不同程度的优势。(C)2005爱思唯尔有限公司。保留所有权利。
Punishment is an important mechanism promoting the evolution of altruism among non-relatives. We investigate the coevolution of altruism and punitive behavior, considering four possible strategies: the altruist punisher (AP, a cooperator who punishes defectors), the altruist non-punisher (AN, a pure cooperator), the selfish punisher (SP, a defector who punishes defectors), and the selfish non-punisher (SN, a pure defector). The SP uses a paradoxical strategy as it punishes other defectors. We analyse the effects of SP and AN on the coevolution of altruism and punishment. We study both the score-dependent viability model (whereby the game's score affects survivorship only) and the score-dependent fertility model (whereby the score affects fertility only). In the viability model of a completely mixed population, SP first drives out SN, and hence it helps cooperators (AP and AN) to evolve. In contrast, in the fertility model of a completely mixed population, neither SP nor AN helps the evolution of cooperation. In both the viability and fertility models of a lattice-structured population, SP promotes the spread of AP. In contrast, AN discourages the evolution of AP. These results can be understood that punishment is a form of spite behavior, paying a cost to reduce the fitness of the opponents, and that different models give different magnitude of advantage to spite behavior. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.