Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others' referential communication
Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others' referential communication
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x
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发表时间：
2010-11-01
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Csibra, Gergely
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Southgate, Victoria;Chevallier, Coralie;Csibra, Gergely
最近的研究表明，婴儿具有解决非语言交流手势的指称模糊性以及推断交流者话语的预期含义的实用能力。这些能力与“孩子直到 4 岁左右才能推理他人的内部心理状态”这一观点相矛盾。在当前的研究中，我们测试了 17 个月大的婴儿是否能够追踪沟通者的认知状态，并利用它来推断她想要提及的内容。我们的结果表明，操纵沟通者是否有错误信念会导致婴儿对同一沟通行为产生不同的解释，并在务实的背景下展示早期的心理状态归因。
Recent studies have demonstrated infants' pragmatic abilities for resolving the referential ambiguity of non-verbal communicative gestures, and for inferring the intended meaning of a communicator's utterances. These abilities are difficult to reconcile with the view that it is not until around 4 years that children can reason about the internal mental states of others. In the current study, we tested whether 17-month-old infants are able to track the status of a communicator's epistemic state and use this to infer what she intends to refer to. Our results show that manipulating whether or not a communicator has a false belief leads infants to different interpretations of the same communicative act, and demonstrate early mental state attribution in a pragmatic context.