Differentiation in cognitive and emotional meanings: An evolutionary analysis
Differentiation in cognitive and emotional meanings: An evolutionary analysis
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DOI：
10.1080/02699930701437477
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发表时间：
2007-01-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Davidson, Iain
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barnard, Philip J.;Duke, David J.;Davidson, Iain
人们经常认为，人类的情感以及伴随它们的认知，涉及到与其他物种共享的更基本功能的改进和扩展。这种改进可能依赖于共同或不同的过程和表示。认知和情感的多层次理论区分了不同性质的表征类型，通常涉及自我相关意义的身体，情感和认知属性。本文将采用一个特定的多层次的心理结构的角度来看，并显示如何子系统分化的机制可以允许一个进化的“旧”的角色，情绪控制的行动已经改变成一个更紧密地耦合到意义系统。最后，我们概述了一些说明性的结果，我们的分析，可能会有用的研究在比较心理学，认知考古学，并在实验室研究记忆的情感材料。
It is often argued that human emotions, and the cognitions that accompany them, involve refinements of, and extensions to, more basic functionality shared with other species. Such refinements may rely on common or on distinct processes and representations. Multi-level theories of cognition and affect make distinctions between qualitatively different types of representations often dealing with bodily, affective and cognitive attributes of self-related meanings. This paper will adopt a particular multi-level perspective on mental architecture and show how a mechanism of subsystem differentiation could have allowed an evolutionarily "old'' role for emotion in the control of action to have altered into one more closely coupled to meaning systems. We conclude by outlining some illustrative consequences of our analysis that might usefully be addressed in research in comparative psychology, cognitive archaeology, and in laboratory research on memory for emotional material.