Role of price and enforcement in water allocation: Insights from Game Theory
Role of price and enforcement in water allocation: Insights from Game Theory
复制标题
DOI：
10.1029/2007wr006163
复制
发表时间：
2008-12
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Francisco de Assis Souza Filho;Upmanu Lall;R. L. Porto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Francisco de Assis Souza Filho;Upmanu Lall;R. L. Porto
随着许多国家正在进行水务部门改革，水管理机构如何更好地分配、监管和执行水权的实际问题已经出现。由于未经许可的上游引水，发展中国家的灌溉系统无法向尾端供水的问题已有充分记录。取水的可靠性或与引水点的可用水量相关的不确定性成为一个可能影响用户申请取水许可证以及为许可使用付费的意愿的参数。水务机构通过有效执行水权来减少这种不确定性的能力与该机构监督和执行许可使用的财政能力有关。本文探讨了用户和机构之间的这种相互作用，考虑了水力结构或用水顺序以及定义用户和机构经济性的参数。用户搭便车行为的可能性以及他们对许可使用的建议都是以此设置为条件得出的。所提出的分析是在“法律和经济学”理论框架下进行的，将用户交互建模为博弈论企业。巴西塞阿拉州被宽松地用作示例设置，索引的实验参数值大约与当前决策相关。讨论了在参与式决策中使用这些想法的潜力。本文是开发一个概念框架来分析此类情况的初步尝试，但重点是水库-运河系统水权执法。
As many countries are moving toward water sector reforms, practical issues of how water management institutions can better effect allocation, regulation, and enforcement of water rights have emerged. The problem of nonavailability of water to tailenders on an irrigation system in developing countries, due to unlicensed upstream diversions is well documented. The reliability of access or equivalently the uncertainty associated with water availability at their diversion point becomes a parameter that is likely to influence the application by users for water licenses, as well as their willingness to pay for licensed use. The ability of a water agency to reduce this uncertainty through effective water rights enforcement is related to the fiscal ability of the agency to monitor and enforce licensed use. In this paper, this interplay across the users and the agency is explored, considering the hydraulic structure or sequence of water use and parameters that define the users and the agency's economics. The potential for free rider behavior by the users, as well as their proposals for licensed use are derived conditional on this setting. The analyses presented are developed in the framework of the theory of “Law and Economics,” with user interactions modeled as a game theoretic enterprise. The state of Ceara, Brazil, is used loosely as an example setting, with parameter values for the experiments indexed to be approximately those relevant for current decisions. The potential for using the ideas in participatory decision making is discussed. This paper is an initial attempt to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing such situations but with a focus on the reservoir‐canal system water rights enforcement.