Higher Necessity
Higher Necessity
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更高的必要性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
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通讯作者：
J. Noller
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Noller
本文的目的是分析谢林的相容主义的自由的意志，特别是在他的哲学调查到人类自由的本质（1809年）。我将论证，针对康德的先验相容主义，谢林提出了一种“意志相容主义”，根据这种观点，自由意志来自自然，并不像康德所主张的那样等同于实践理性。最后，我将把谢林的意志相容论与最近对自由意志的解释联系起来，以便更好地理解他所说的“更高的必然性”概念的含义。
The aim of this paper is to analyze Schelling’s compatibilist account of freedom of the will particularly in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809). I shall argue that against Kant’s transcendental compatibilism Schelling proposes a “volitional compatibilism,” according to which the free will emerges out of nature and is not identical to practical reason as Kant claims. Finally, I will relate Schelling’s volitional compatibilism to more recent accounts of free will in order to better understand what he means by his concept of a “higher necessity.”