The Argument from Moral Experience
The Argument from Moral Experience
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来自道德经验的论证
DOI：
10.1007/s10677-007-9081-7
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Don Loeb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Don Loeb
人们常说，我们的道德经验（广泛地解释为包括我们思考和谈论道德的方式）具有某种看似客观的特征，这支持了有利于客观主义理论（根据该理论，道德是事实或真理的领域）和反对反客观主义理论（如麦基的错误理论）（根据该理论，它不是）的假设。在本文中，我认为我们的道德经验并不以这种方式支持客观主义道德理论。我首先指出，我们的道德体验并不具有通常所声称的一致客观的特征。我继续论证，即使道德经验将道德预设或展示为一个事实领域，我们仍然需要一个理由来支持它是这样一个领域的理论。我认为尝试提供这样一个理由的四种最有希望的方法是：（A）最佳解释推理，（B）认知保守主义，（C）轻信原则，以及（D）广泛反思平衡方法。我认为，在每种情况下，所讨论的策略都不支持有利于客观主义道德理论的假设。
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.