Winning woman suffrage one step at a time: Social movements and the logic of the legislative process
Winning woman suffrage one step at a time: Social movements and the logic of the legislative process
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DOI：
10.1353/sof.2005.0037
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发表时间：
2005-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Dahlin, EC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
King, BG;Cornwall, M;Dahlin, EC
我们描述一种立法逻辑理论。这一逻辑的依据是，立法过程的每一个后续阶段都有越来越严格的规则，其后果也越来越严重。这种逻辑在立法过程中不均衡地分配了社会运动的影响。社会运动在后期阶段的影响力应该较小，因为在后期阶段，严格的要求更有可能耗尽有限的资源，而行动的后果将导致立法者撤销其支持。我们运用这一理论来研究国家一级的妇女选举权立法。我们发现，立法者通过将妇女选举权问题带到立法论坛来回应选举权主义者，但一旦选举权法案进入投票阶段，社会运动策略和组织的差异并没有产生很大的影响。
We describe a theory of legislative logic. This logic is based on the observation that each succeeding stage of the legislative process has increasingly stringent rules and becomes more consequential. This logic unevenly distributes the influence of social movements across the legislative process. Social movements should have less influence at later stages where stringent requirements are more likely to exhaust limited resources and where the consequentiality of action will cause legislators to revoke their support. We apply the theory to a study of state-level woman suffrage legislation. We find that legislators responded to suffragists by bringing the issue of woman suffrage to the legislative forum, but once suffrage bills reached the voting stage, differences in social movement tactics and organization did not have as great an impact.