Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years
Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years
复制标题
选民倡议的财政影响：过去 30 年的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
J. Matsusaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Matsusaka
在美国的23个州，公民可以通过公民投票发起和批准法律;在其他27个州，法律只能由民选代表提出。本文比较了在这两种制度安排下，国家和地方政府在过去30年的财政行为。主要发现是，在选民倡议的州，支出明显低于纯代议制州，大约为4%。它还发现，地方支出较高，国家支出较低的倡议国家。在收入方面，倡议州较少依赖基础广泛的税收，更多地依赖与服务相关的收费。总之，证据表明，这一举措导致政府部门的总体规模缩小，并表明它导致再分配活动水平下降。
In 23 American states, citizens can initiate and approve laws by popular vote; in the other 27 states, laws can be proposed only by elected representatives. This paper compares the fiscal behavior of state and local governments over the last 30 years under these two institutional arrangements. The main finding is that spending is significantly lower, on the order of 4 percent, in states with voter initiatives than in pure representative states. It is also found that local spending is higher and state spending is lower in initiative states. On the revenue side, initiative states rely less on broad-based taxes and more on charges tied to services. Taken together, the evidence indicates that the initiative leads to a reduction in the overall size of the government sector and suggests that it causes a decline in the level of redistributional activity.