Algorithms and Computation
Algorithms and Computation
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算法与计算
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-35261-4_71
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Deng X
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Deng X
我们研究了双向拍卖市场的设计，做市商希望通过从卖家那里买低和卖高给买家来最大化其总收入。本文考虑了一个贝叶斯模型，在该模型中，买卖双方对市场上产品的价值具有独立的概率分布，对于最简单的模型，每个卖方都有一种不可分割的商品，其数量有界（整数），可以卖给买方，买方可能要求有界数量的副本。我们建立了一个最大化机制，使做市商能够最大化自己的收入。对于更一般的情况，每个卖方的产品可能是不同的，我们考虑了一些变量的约束条件的供应和需求。对于每一个，我们开发了一个多项式时间可计算的真实机制，使做市商实现的收入至少是任何其他真实机制的收入的常数α倍。
We study double auction market design where the market maker wants to maximize its total revenue by buying low from the sellers and selling high to the buyers. We consider a Bayesian setting where buyers and sellers have independent probability distributions on the values of products on the market.For the simplest setting, each seller has one kind of indivisible good with a bounded (integer) amount that can be sold to a buyer, who may demand a bounded number of copies. We develop a maximum mechanism for the market maker to maximize its own revenue.For the more general case where each seller's product may be different, we consider a number of variants in terms of constraints on supplies and demands. For each of them, we develop a polynomial time computable truthful mechanism for the market maker to achieve a revenue at least a constantαtimes the revenue of any other truthful mechanism.