Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency
Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency
复制标题
投机攻击：独特的平衡和透明度
DOI：
10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00167-2
复制
发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
G. Illing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Frank Heinemann;G. Illing
具有多重均衡的模型是解释货币攻击的一种流行方式。Morris和Shin(1998)已经证明，在这些模型的背景下，一旦引入有噪声的私人信息，可能会出现唯一的均衡。在这篇文章中，我们将Morris和Shin的方法应用于更广泛的概率分布类别，并表明-使用支配策略的迭代消除技术-他们的结果仍然成立，即使我们考虑到太阳黑子和个人对其他代理人战略行为的不确定性。我们清楚地阐述了该模型的逻辑，并分析了透明度对投机性攻击概率的影响。对于噪声信号均匀分布的情况，我们证明了政府政策透明度的增加降低了攻击的可能性。
Models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks. Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that, in the context of those models, unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced. In this paper, we apply the method of Morris and Shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show—using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies—that their results continue to hold, even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents. We provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack. For the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals, we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
CUKIERMAN, A;MELTZER, AH
通讯作者：
MELTZER, AH