The aggregation of preferences: can we ignore the past?

The aggregation of preferences: can we ignore the past?
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偏好的聚合:我们可以忽略过去吗?

DOI:
10.1007/s11238-010-9225-4
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发表时间:
2011
影响因子:
0.8
通讯作者:
Stéphane Zuber
Stéphane Zuber
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Stéphane Zuber

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本文表明,只有在一组严格的条件得到验证时,双亲社会福利函数才能是历史无关的和时间一致的。个人效用必须是相加的。社会福利函数必须是这些效用的线性组合。此外,只有当所有个体具有相同的恒定贴现率时,社会偏好才是平稳的。结果在确定性动态选择和不确定性动态选择两种框架下实现。这些应用程序强调,这些条件不太可能被个人偏好所满足,而且它们严重限制了社会偏好。
The article shows that a Paretian social welfare function can be history independent and time consistent only if a stringent set of conditions is verified. Individual utilities must be additive. The social welfare function must be a linear combination of these utilities. Social preferences are stationary only if, in addition, all individuals have the same constant discount rate. The results are implemented in two frameworks: deterministic dynamic choice and dynamic choice under uncertainty. The applications highlight that the conditions are unlikely to be met by individual preferences, and that they severely restrict social preferences.