Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict
Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict
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民主化、政治制度和种族冲突
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Samuel S. Stanton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stephen M. Saideman;D. Lanoue;Michael Campenni;Samuel S. Stanton
虽然有很多关于民主化是否会导致种族冲突的争论，许多比较主义者也在争论哪种政治制度最适合管理社区冲突，但很少有大N的工作涉及这些问题。作者运用民族冲突理论--民族安全困境--来预测民主化和政治制度对民族动乱的影响。然后，他们通过对1985年至1998年处于危险中的少数民族数据集中的所有族裔群体进行一系列汇总的时间序列分析来测试这些预测。作者发现，民主化，联邦制和总统制可能并不像一些人所说的那样有问题，比例代表制倾向于减少严重的种族暴力。最后，他们提出了一些未来研究的方向。
Although there has been much debate about whether democratization causes ethnic conflict, and many comparativists have argued about which kinds of political institutions are best for managing communal strife, little large-N work has addressed these issues. The authors apply a theory of ethnic conflict—the ethnic security dilemma—to derive predictions about the impact of democratization and political institutions on ethnic unrest. They then test these predictions by performing a series of pooled time-series analyses covering all ethnic groups in the Minorities at Risk data set from 1985 to 1998. The authors find that democratization, federalism, and presidentialism may not be as problematic as some argue and that proportional representation tends to reduce severe ethnic violence. They conclude by suggesting some directions for future research.