Managing Strategic Buyers
Managing Strategic Buyers
复制标题
管理战略买家
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
M. Palacios
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
O. Bohoudi;A. Bruynzeel;S. Senan;J. Cuijpers;B. Slotman;F. Lagerwaard;M. Palacios
我们考虑一个垄断者的问题，他必须在某个截止日期之前出售他的库存，面对具有独立私人价值的购买者。卖方面临着不完美的价格歧视和维持有效的保留价之间的基本权衡。当只有一个单位，只有几个买家时，卖方基本上会把不可接受的价格一直贴到最后，在这一点上，价格会在一系列跳跃中暴跌到超过边际成本的“底价”。当有许多买家时，卖家放弃这个底价，以便更有效地筛选买家，价格随着时间的推移不断下降。
We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline, facing buyers with independent private values. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is only one unit and only a few buyers, the seller essentially posts unacceptable prices up to the very end, at which point prices collapse in a series of jumps to a “reserve price” exceeding marginal cost. When there are many buyers, the seller abandons this reserve price in order to more effectively screen buyers, with prices decreasing continuously over time.