Deducibility, Entailment and Analytic Containment
Deducibility, Entailment and Analytic Containment
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可推论、蕴涵和分析遏制
DOI：
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. B. Angell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. B. Angell
蕴涵的概念经常与演绎联系在一起：A被认为蕴含B当B在逻辑上可以从A.1演绎。它还与康德的分析包容意义中的包容概念联系在一起：只有当B的意义包含在A的意义中时，A才蕴含B。但演绎和包容是两个截然不同的概念，未能区分它们导致将它们合并到形式系统中的失败尝试。其中一种尝试是Anderson和Belnap的系统E，其中对自然演绎的Fitch类型的理论进行了修改，以纳入某种意义上的“包容”2。另一种尝试是Parry的“分析蕴涵”系统，AI，它开始于一种更受限的包容意识，但通常被提出为一种演绎理论(参见。挡出33和72)。
The concept of entailment is often connected with deducibility: A is said to entail B iff B is logically deducible from A.1 It has also been connected to the concept of containment in Kant’s sense of analytic containment: A entails B only if the meaning of B is contained in the meaning of A. But the concepts of deducibility and containment are two distinct concepts, and the failure to distinguish them leads to faulty attempts to merge them in formal systems. One such attempt is Anderson and Belnap’s system, E, in which a Fitch-type theory of natural deduction is modified to incorporate a certain sense of “containment”2. Another is Parry’s system, AI, of “analytic implication” which began with a more restricted sense of containment but has usually been presented as a theory of deducibility (cf. Parry 33 and 72).