Corporate Restructuring in Japan: Who Monitors the Monitor?
Corporate Restructuring in Japan: Who Monitors the Monitor?
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.965595
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发表时间：
2007-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kotaro Inoue;H. Kato;Marc Bremer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kotaro Inoue;H. Kato;Marc Bremer
Peek和Rosengren [Peek，J.，Rosengren，E.，2005.《非自然选择：日本的不正当激励与信贷错配》。American Economic Review 95，1144-1166]表明，当泡沫经济时代结束时，监管的宽容和不正当的激励使日本银行能够广泛参与常青化。在日本，企业监督机制不是以市场为基础，而是以银行和关联企业为代表的大利益相关者为基础，这是首次对陷入财务困境的企业的私人债务重组的经济性进行实证分析的综合研究。这些利益相关者预计将有效地解决潜在的破产或崩溃与更好的信息所产生的长期关系与陷入困境的公司。然而，我们的研究发现，由他们领导的私人重组之所以失败，是因为根本性解决方案的实施受到了拖延。不愿满足陷入困境的公司的需求，表明这些利益攸关方在制定纪律方面的弱点，因此需要一个“监督监督者”的制度。
Peek and Rosengren [Peek, J., Rosengren, E., 2005. Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan. American Economic Review 95, 1144-1166] showed that, when the bubble economy era ended, regulatory forbearance and perverse incentives allowed Japanese banks to engage extensively in evergreening. This is the first comprehensive study to empirically analyze the economics of private debt restructurings of financially distressed companies in Japan, where the corporate monitoring mechanism is not market based but large-stakeholder based - typically, banks and affiliated companies. These stakeholders are expected to efficiently resolve potential bankruptcy or collapse with better information resulting from long-term relationships with the distressed firms. Our study, however, finds that private restructurings led by them failed because of delays in implementing fundamental solutions. Forbearance in addressing the needs of distressed firms demonstrates the weakness of such stakeholders in instituting discipline, hence the need for a system to "monitor the monitor".