Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies
Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies
复制标题
格莱珉贷款效率高吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tomas Sjöström
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Rai;Tomas Sjöström
许多人认为格莱珉银行的一项关键创新是鼓励借款人在困难时期互相帮助。为了分析这一点，我们研究了一个机制设计问题，即借款人彼此共享信息，但他们有限的侧面签约能力阻止他们撰写完整的保险合同。我们推导出一种有效诱导相互保险的借贷机制。借款人有必要互相提交报告以提高效率。这种交叉报告增加了失败借款人的讨价还价能力，并且对串通反对银行的行为具有强大的作用。版权所有 2004，Wiley-Blackwell。
Many believe that a key innovation by the Grameen Bank is to encourage borrowers to help each other in hard times. To analyse this, we study a mechanism design problem where borrowers share information about each other, but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts. We derive a lending mechanism which efficiently induces mutual insurance. It is necessary for borrowers to submit reports about each other to achieve efficiency. Such cross-reporting increases the bargaining power of unsuccessful borrowers, and is robust to collusion against the bank. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.