The Choice of Law Framework for Efficient Regulatory Competition in Contract Law
The Choice of Law Framework for Efficient Regulatory Competition in Contract Law
复制标题
合同法中有效监管竞争的法律框架选择
DOI：
10.5771/9783845259154_300
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Giesela Ruhl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Giesela Ruhl
合同法上的规制竞争是近年来的一个热门话题。然而，辩论的焦点是，监管机构是否实际上为适用其合同法而竞争。相比之下，这种竞争----如果存在的话----在什么条件下可能产生积极影响的问题在很大程度上被忽视了。在这篇论文中，我试图填补这一空白。我认为，经验证据表明，在合同法中存在或可能存在监管竞争，国际私法层面的选择自由可以确保其效率。然而，为了诱导有效的监管竞争，必须适当设计选择自由。这是因为法律选择条款可能无法代表受法律选择影响的所有当事人的利益，并导致监管者在调整其合同法时忽视这些利益。不幸的是，在现行国家或国际国际私法制度中对选择自由的许多限制中，只有那些为保护弱者或第三方服务的限制实际上以确保有效的监管竞争的方式对选择自由进行监管。与此相反，其他限制则对监管竞争的限制超过了必要程度，从而损害了法律市场的潜在积极作用。对于选择非国家法律或与国家无关的法律的限制，尤其如此：它们无助于避免一场逐底竞争，而只是减少了法律市场上竞争者的数量。因此，国家和国际的国际私法制度应当放弃这些限制，从而确保选择自由的设计实际上促进有效的监管竞争。
Regulatory competition in contract law has become a popular topic in recent years. The focus of the debate, however, has been whether regulators actually compete for application of their contract laws. In contrast, the question under which conditions this competition – if it exists – might have positive effects has largely been ignored. In the paper I set out to fill this gap. I argue that empirical evidence shows that there is – or that there can be – regulatory competition in contract law and that freedom of choice on the level of private international law may ensure its efficiency. However, to induce efficient regulatory competition freedom of choice must be properly designed. This is because choice of law-clauses may fail to represent the interests of all parties affected by the choice and cause regulators to ignore these interests when adjusting their contract laws. Unfortunately, of the many restrictions of freedom of choice that are to be found in current national or international private international law regimes only those that serve the protection of weaker or third parties actually regulate freedom of choice in a way that ensures efficient regulatory competition. Other restrictions, in contrast, limit regulatory competition more than necessary and, thus, compromise the potential positive effects of a market for laws. This holds particularly true for the restrictions relating to the choice of a non-state or unconnected law: they do not help to avoid a race to the bottom, but merely reduce the number of competitors on the market for laws. National and international private international law regimes should, therefore, abandon these restrictions and thereby ensure that the design of freedom of choice actually fosters efficient regulatory competition.