Symmetric tax competition and welfare with footloose capital
Symmetric tax competition and welfare with footloose capital
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对称的税收竞争和福利与自由资本
DOI：
10.1111/jors.12517
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Peng Shin‐Kun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zeng Dao‐Zhi;Peng Shin‐Kun
本文考察了垄断竞争经济中两个对称国家之间对移动的资本的税收竞争。只要消费者/政府偏离对称均衡，税收就会产生对区位和消费的扭曲。考虑到所有可能的扭曲，本文发现，均衡税率可能是积极的，当贸易成本高，而它是负的，当贸易成本低，如果消费者有可加性可分离的偏好，表现出越来越多的相对爱的品种减少。这种税率与交易成本的非单调关系在市场一体化开始时进一步伴随着福利损失。促进竞争效应和收入效应对得出结果都至关重要。
This paper examines the tax competition for mobile capital between two symmetric countries in a monopolistic competition economy. Taxation generates its own distortions of location and consumption as long as consumers/governments deviate from the symmetric equilibrium. Taking all possible distortions into account, this paper finds that the equilibrium tax rate may be positive and increasing when trade costs are high while it is negative and decreasing when trade costs are low if consumers have additively separable preferences displaying an increasing relative love for variety. This nonmonotonic relationship of tax rate with trade costs is further accompanied by welfare loss when market integration starts. The procompetitive effect and the income effect are both crucial to deriving the results.