Dynamic games of fiscal and monetary policiesfor Austria
Dynamic games of fiscal and monetary policiesfor Austria
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奥地利财政和货币政策的动态博弈
DOI：
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
R. Neck
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Neck
本文考虑了财政政策(政府)和货币政策(中央银行)之间的动态博弈。两个决策者都被假定为优化二次时间间隔目标函数；他们对目标就业和物价稳定的权重不同。奥地利经济的一个计量经济学模型是一个动态系统，财政和货币政策在这个系统上发挥作用。对于非合作解(开环反馈Nash和Stackelberg均衡)和合作解，计算了控制变量和内生变量的数值时间路径。结果表明，这些解决方案的结果需要更多的反周期政策，而不是模型的预测。所考虑的解决方案概念的结果之间只有很小的差异。在对宏观经济目标变量的影响方面，政府的立场比央行的立场更强。
This paper considers a dynamic game between fiscal policy (the government) and monetarypolicy (the central bank). Both policy‐makers are assumed to optimize quadratic intertemporalobjective functions; they attach different weights to the targets employment andprice stability. An econometric model of the Austrian economy is the dynamic system uponwhich fiscal and monetary policies act. Numerical time paths of control and endogenousvariables are calculated for non‐cooperative (open‐loop and feedback Nash and Stackelbergequilibria) and cooperative solutions. It is shown that the outcomes of these solutions entailmore countercyclical policies than a projection of the model. There are only small differencesbetween the results of the solution concepts considered. The position of the government isstronger than that of the central bank as regards their influence on macroeconomic targetvariables.