Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies

Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies
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异质性、锦标赛和等级制度

DOI:
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发表时间:
1988
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Luis Guasch
Luis Guasch
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Bhattacharya;Luis Guasch

文献摘要

被引文献

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锦标赛合同的特点是,同时引起第一个最有效的努力水平和自我选择的风险中性异质工人到能力特定的合同。自我选择的能力类型之间的比较有时是必要的,以达到效率。在等级制组织中,不经常观察这种合同的企业被探索。
Tournament contracts are characterized that simultaneously elicit first-best efficient effort levels and self-selection of risk-neutral heterogeneous workers into ability-specific contracts. Comparisons across self-selected ability types are shown to be sometimes necessary to attain efficiency. Rationales are explored for not commonly observing such contracts in hierarchical organizations.