Efficient and Provably Secure Key Agreement for Modern Smart Metering Communications
Efficient and Provably Secure Key Agreement for Modern Smart Metering Communications
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DOI：
10.3390/en11102662
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发表时间：
2018-10-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
Martin, Andrew
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Braeken, An;Kumar, Pardeep;Martin, Andrew
现代智能电表通信和智能电网网络的安全性一直是人们关注的一个领域。在这一领域中，不需要可信第三方积极参与的基于身份的相互认证（包括凭证隐私）是智能电网技术的重要组成部分。近年来，针对智能电网提出了几种具有不同安全特性（如相互认证和密钥协议）的方案。此外，据说这些方案在广泛接受的Canetti-Krawczyk （CK）安全模型下提供会话密钥安全性。相反，我们认为，在CK模型下，它们仍然是脆弱的。为了解决这个问题，我们提出了一种新的可证明安全的智能计量通信密钥协议模型。提出的模型保留了安全特性，并提供了更多抵抗拒绝服务攻击的能力。此外，我们的方案是无配对的，从而产生高效的计算和通信工作。
Security in modern smart metering communications and in smart grid networks has been an area of interest recently. In this field, identity-based mutual authentication including credential privacy without active involvement of a trusted third party is an important building block for smart grid technology. Recently, several schemes have been proposed for the smart grid with various security features (e.g., mutual authentication and key agreement). Moreover, these schemes are said to offer session key security under the widely accepted Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) security model. Instead, we argue that all of them are still vulnerable under the CK model. To remedy the problem, we present a new provably secure key agreement model for smart metering communications. The proposed model preserves the security features and provides more resistance against a denial of service attack. Moreover, our scheme is pairing-free, resulting in highly efficient computational and communication efforts.