Design and Verification of the Arm Confidential Compute Architecture
Design and Verification of the Arm Confidential Compute Architecture
复制标题
DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Xupeng Li;Xuheng Li;Christoffer Dall;Ronghui Gu;Jason Nieh;Yousuf Sait;Gareth Stockwell
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xupeng Li;Xuheng Li;Christoffer Dall;Ronghui Gu;Jason Nieh;Yousuf Sait;Gareth Stockwell
The increasing use of sensitive private data in computing is matched by a growing concern regarding data privacy. System software such as hypervisors and operating systems are supposed to protect and isolate applications and their private data, but their large codebases contain many vulnerabilities that can risk data confidentiality and integrity. We introduce Realms, a new abstraction for confidential computing to protect the data confidentiality and integrity of virtual machines. Hardware creates and enforces Realm world, a new physical address space for Realms. Firmware controls the hardware to secure Realms and handles requests from untrusted system software to manage Realms, including creating and running them. Untrusted system software retains control of the dynamic allocation of memory to Realms, but cannot access Realm memory contents, even if run at a higher privileged level. To guarantee the security of Realms, we verified the firmware, introducing novel verification techniques that enable us to prove, for the first time, the security and correctness of concurrent software with hand-over-hand locking and dynamically allocated shared page tables, data races in kernel code running on relaxed memory hardware, integrated C and Arm assembly code calling one another, and untrusted software being in full control of allocating system resources. Realms are included in the Arm Confidential Compute Architecture.