Government-leading welfare-improving collusion
Government-leading welfare-improving collusion
复制标题
政府主导的改善福利的勾结
DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2017.11.005
复制
发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Matsumura Toshihiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haraguchi Junichi;Matsumura Toshihiro
我们讨论混合双头垄断中政府主导的改善福利的勾结。我们制定了一个无限重复的博弈，其中福利最大化企业和利润最大化企业共存。政府提出了改善福利的共谋，如果两家公司都有动力遵循的话，这种做法是可持续的。我们在这个长期背景下比较了两种竞争结构——古诺和伯特兰。我们发现，当贴现因子足够大时，古诺竞争会产生更大的福利，而当贴现因子较小时，伯特兰竞争会更好。
We discuss government-leading welfare-improving collusion in a mixed duopoly. We formulate an infinitely repeated game in which a welfare-maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm coexist. The government proposes welfare-improving collusion and this is sustainable if both firms have incentives to follow it. We compare two competition structures—Cournot and Bertrand—in this long-run context. We find that Cournot competition yields greater welfare when the discount factor is sufficiently large, whereas Bertrand competition is better when the discount factor is small.