Removal Attacks on Logic Locking and Camouflaging Techniques
Removal Attacks on Logic Locking and Camouflaging Techniques
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DOI：
10.1109/tetc.2017.2740364
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发表时间：
2020-04
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Muhammad Yasin;Bodhisatwa Mazumdar;O. Sinanoglu;Jeyavijayan Rajendran
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Muhammad Yasin;Bodhisatwa Mazumdar;O. Sinanoglu;Jeyavijayan Rajendran
随着全球化和分布式IC设计流程的采用，IP盗版、逆向工程和假冒威胁变得越来越普遍。逻辑混淆技术，包括逻辑锁定和IC封装已被开发，以解决这些紧急的挑战。逻辑锁定和伪装技术的一个主要挑战是抵御基于布尔可满足性（SAT）的攻击，这些攻击可以在几分钟内绕过最先进的解决方案。在过去的一年中，已经提出了多种SAT攻击弹性解决方案，如Anti-SAT和AND树插入（ATI）。在本文中，我们对这些对策进行了安全分析，并表明它们在试图阻止SAT攻击时留下了结构痕迹。我们提出了三种攻击，即“信号概率偏斜”（SPS）攻击，“AppSAT引导删除（AGR）攻击，和“敏化引导SAT”（SGS）攻击，可以打破反SAT和ATI，在几分钟内。
With the adoption of a globalized and distributed IC design flow, IP piracy, reverse engineering, and counterfeiting threats are becoming more prevalent. Logic obfuscation techniques including logic locking and IC camouflaging have been developed to address these emergent challenges. A major challenge for logic locking and camouflaging techniques is to resist Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based attacks that can circumvent state-of-the-art solutions within minutes. Over the past year, multiple SAT attack resilient solutions such as Anti-SAT and AND-tree insertion (ATI) have been presented. In this paper, we perform a security analysis of these countermeasures and show that they leave structural traces behind in their attempts to thwart the SAT attack. We present three attacks, namely “signal probability skew” (SPS) attack, “AppSAT guided removal (AGR) attack, and “sensitization guided SAT” (SGS) attack”, that can break Anti-SAT and ATI, within minutes.