Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy
Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy
复制标题
社会保障、公共教育和代议制民主的发展
DOI：
10.1007/s001480050146
复制
发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
A. Kemnitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Kemnitz
本文研究了代议制民主中公共教育和现收现付制社会保障之间的关系，在代议制民主中，政府对工人和养老金领取者的投票和游说活动做出反应。虽然在实际缴纳社会保障方面存在代际冲突，但工人们可能更喜欢公共教育，因为它对以后的养老金福利有积极影响。人口老龄化削弱了养老金领取者的相对游说能力，导致更高的缴费率、教育扩张和更高的人均收入增长。
This paper studies the relationship between public education and pay-as-you-go social security in a representative democracy, where the government reacts both to voting and lobbying activities of workers and pensioners. While an intergenerational conflict prevails concerning actual social security contributions, workers may prefer public education for its positive effect on later pension benefits. Population aging diminishes the relative lobbying power of pensioners, leading to a higher contribution rate, educational expansion, and higher per capita income growth.