ON DISTINGUISHING EPISTEMIC FROM PRAGMATIC ACTION
ON DISTINGUISHING EPISTEMIC FROM PRAGMATIC ACTION
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DOI：
10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
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发表时间：
1994-10-01
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
MAGLIO, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
KIRSH, D;MAGLIO, P
我们提供的数据和论据表明，在俄罗斯方块（一种实时的交互式视频游戏）中，通过在现实世界中执行操作比单独在头脑中执行计算操作可以更快、更容易和更可靠地解决某些认知和感知问题。 我们发现，这款视频游戏的玩家所做的一些平移和旋转最好理解为利用世界来提高认知的动作。 这些行动不是用于实施计划或实施反应；而是用于实施计划。它们被用来改变世界，以简化解决问题的任务。 因此，我们区分了实用行动（为了使身体更接近目标而执行的行动）和认知行动（为了发现隐藏的或难以在心理上计算的信息而执行的行动）。为了说明认知行动的必要性，我们首先开发了俄罗斯方块认知的标准信息处理模型，并表明它无法解释游戏中人类玩家的表现数据，即使我们放松了完全顺序处理的假设。 标准模型忽略了玩家采取的许多行动，因为它们看起来没有动机或多余。 然而，我们的研究表明，这样的行动实际上绝非多余。它们在提高人类绩效方面发挥着宝贵的作用。 我们认为，传统的解释是有限的，因为它们认为行动具有单一功能：改变世界。 通过认识行动的第二个功能——认知功能——我们可以解释传统模型无法解释的许多行动。 尽管我们的论点得到了来自俄罗斯方块的大量例子的支持，但我们概述了如何将新的认知行为类别更广泛地纳入行为理论中。
We present data and argument to show that in Tetris-a real-time, interactive video game-certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by players of this video game are best understood as actions that use the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions-actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal-from epistemic actions-actions performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally.To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris cognition and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game-even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we show that such actions are actually far from superfluous; they play a valuable role in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action-an epistemic function-we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the new category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally.