Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis
Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis
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公共产品的优化供给：综合
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01686.x
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nicolaj Verdelin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Kreiner;Nicolaj Verdelin
目前，文献中存在两种关于最佳公共产品提供的相互竞争的方法。标准方法强调了扭曲税收和分配问题的重要性。新的方法通过调整非线性所得税来消除分配方面的担忧，并发现当偏好在商品和休闲中可分离时，这重新激活了简单的萨缪尔森规则。我们通过证明这两种方法来自相同的基本公式来提供一个综合。我们进一步发展了新的方法，在不对偏好强加强烈假设的情况下，推导出公共产品最优水平的一般、直观的公式。这一公式表明，扭曲的税收可能会像在标准方法中一样发挥作用。然而，最优供给的主要决定因素是完全不同的，强调最优供给的传统公式只在非常特殊的情况下才能得出。
There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing strong assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case.