Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crises: A Simple Model
Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crises: A Simple Model
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.294584
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发表时间：
2001-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Rajan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Rajan
在确定银行贷款的期限结构中存在预先确定的短期国际负债，我们表明，在银行的资产负债表的期限错配是完全符合银行作为自我利益，优化代理人的假设。虽然经常被归因于与安全网有关的道德风险，但分析表明，金融危机可能在没有安全网的情况下发生。
In determining the maturity structure of bank loans in the presence of pre-determined short-term international liabilities, we show that maturity mismatches in banks’ balance sheets are fully consistent with the assumption of banks acting as self-interested, optimising agents. Although often attributed to the moral hazard associated with safety nets, the analysis shows that financial crises can occur in their absence.