The Relationship Between the Normalized Gradient Addition Mechanism and Quadratic Voting.
The Relationship Between the Normalized Gradient Addition Mechanism and Quadratic Voting.
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归一化梯度加法机制与二次投票之间的关系。
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-017-0414-3
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Lougee,Derek
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Benjamin,Daniel;Heffetz,Ori;Kimball,Miles;Lougee,Derek
二次投票和归一化梯度附加机制都是个体面临二次预算约束的社会选择机制，但它们适用于不同的情境。本文通过调整其中一种或两种机制以适用于同一情境，探讨了这两种机制在三种情境下的关系：连续政策的边际调整、对许多公共选择的同时投票以及对单一公共选择伴随私人货币后果的投票。在此过程中，我们提供了二次投票的一些形式化分析，当投票（而不是金钱）由机制设计者平均分配的抽象令牌支付时。
Quadratic voting and the normalized gradient addition mechanism are both social choice mechanisms that confront individuals with quadratic budget constraints, but they are applicable in different contexts. Adapting one or both to apply to the same context, this paper explores the relationship between these two mechanisms in three contexts: marginal adjustments of continuous policies, simultaneous voting on many public choices, and voting on a single public choice accompanied by private monetary consequences. In the process, we provide some formal analysis of quadratic voting when (instead of money) votes are paid for with abstract tokens that are equally distributed by the mechanism designer.