The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs
The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01909.x
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发表时间：
2007-05-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Bloom, Paul
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Birch, Susan A. J.;Bloom, Paul
评估其他人知道和相信什么对于准确理解人类行为至关重要。幼儿发现很难对错误的信念进行推理（即，与现实相冲突）。这一困难的根源是一个相当有争议的问题。在这里，我们表明，如果使用足够敏感的措施，成年人在类似于幼儿使用的错误信念任务中会表现出缺陷。特别是，我们在错误信念推理中表现出知识诅咒偏见。也就是说，成年人自己对事件结果的了解可能会损害他们对另一个人对该事件的信念的推理能力。我们还发现，成年人对事件的可解释性的看法介导了这种偏见的程度。这些发现揭示了错误信念推理的因素，并根据其对成人和儿童社会认知的影响进行了讨论。
Assessing what other people know and believe is critical for accurately understanding human action. Young children find it difficult to reason about false beliefs (i.e., beliefs that conflict with reality). The source of this difficulty is a matter of considerable debate. Here we show that if sensitive-enough measures are used, adults show deficits in a false-belief task similar to one used with young children. In particular, we show a curse-of-knowledge bias in false-belief reasoning. That is, adults' own knowledge of an event's outcome can compromise their ability to reason about another persons beliefs about that event. We also found that adults' perception of the plausibility of an event mediates the extent of this bias. These findings shed light on the factors involved in false-belief reasoning and are discussed in light of their implications for both adults' and children's social cognition.