Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts
Price versus Quantity in a Duopolistic Market with Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Contracts
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双寡头市场中的价格与数量以及管理授权合同的讨价还价
DOI：
10.1002/mde.2779
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
久留島潤;富田治芳;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本文研究了双寡头垄断企业所有者和经营者就管理委托契约的内容讨价还价时战略契约的内生选择问题。结果表明，当企业内部管理者相对于所有者的议价能力足够高时，基于双方所有者选择的数量合同的数量竞争可以在均衡中唯一地观察到，而当相对议价能力足够低时，均衡中可以观察到数量竞争和价格竞争。版权所有©2015 John Wiley&Sons，Ltd.
This paper studies the endogenous choices of strategic contracts in a duopoly with bargaining between the owner and manager of each firm over the content of the managerial delegation contract. We show that when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner within each firm is sufficiently high, quantity competition based on the quantity contracts chosen by the owners of both firms can be uniquely observed in the equilibrium, whereas quantity competition and price competition can be observed in the equilibrium when this relative bargaining power is sufficiently low. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.