Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR
Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR
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比较 FPTP 和 PR 下的战略投票
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Renan Levine
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Abramson;John H. Aldrich;A. Blais;M. Diamond;Abraham Diskin;I. Indridason;Daniel J. Lee;Renan Levine
基于最近的研究表明，比例代表制（PR）的选民有动机投战略票，作者假设，战略投票的水平是相似的，在第一个过去的职位（FPTP）和PR系统。通过比较美国、墨西哥、英国和以色列的多数主义选举与以色列和荷兰的公共关系选举的投票意向，作者发现，相当一部分选民抛弃了他们最喜欢的候选人或政党，FPTP和公共关系的战略投票模式具有惊人的相似性。在每次选举中，小党派往往会把选票输给大党派。因为在PR系统中往往有更多的小政党，所以在PR系统中战术投票实际上比在FPTP系统中更常见。研究结果表明，无论选举制度如何，选民都关注他们行为的政策后果，以及哪些政党可能在选举后影响政策结果。
Based on recent work that suggests that voters in proportional representation (PR) systems have incentives to cast strategic votes, the authors hypothesize that levels of strategic voting are similar in both first-past-the-post (FPTP) and PR systems. Comparing vote intentions in majoritarian elections in the United States, Mexico, Britain, and Israel to PR elections in Israel and the Netherlands, the authors find that a substantial proportion of the voters desert their most preferred candidate or party and that patterns of strategic voting across FPTP and PR bear striking similarities. In every election, smaller parties tend to lose votes to major parties. Because there tend to be more small parties in PR systems, tactical voting is actually more common under PR than under FPTP. The findings suggest that whatever the electoral system, voters focus on the policy consequences of their behavior and which parties are likely to influence policy outcomes following the election.