An Intelligent Pilot Contamination Attacker-Defender Model for Wireless Networks: A Stackelberg Game Based Approach
An Intelligent Pilot Contamination Attacker-Defender Model for Wireless Networks: A Stackelberg Game Based Approach
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DOI：
10.1007/s11036-022-02012-7
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发表时间：
2022-08
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Zhangnan Wang;Yichen Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhangnan Wang;Yichen Wang
现有的导频污染攻击研究往往假设对手的攻击和干扰策略是固定的。敌人没有对侦察计划作任何战略上的修正。本文分析了在无线通信中，智能恶意用户如何在训练阶段考虑合法用户的作用，调整攻击策略，以提高其窃听性能。通过将防御者与攻击者之间的交互视为一个Stackelberg博弈，作为领导者的Bob选择他的导频训练功率，而作为跟随者的全双工窃听者根据观察到的Bob正在进行的训练信号传输来确定导频污染功率。分析了不同策略空间下的两种均衡。仿真结果表明，该方案能够有效地抵御智能型主动窃听者的攻击，具有较高的保密率和实用性。
Existing studies on pilot contamination attack often assume that the attack and jamming strategies of adversaries are fixed. The enemy has not made any strategic corrections to the detection plan. In this paper, we analyze how an intelligent malicious user considers the role of legitimate user and adjusts attacking strategy during training phase in wireless communication to improve his eavesdropping performance. By defender-attacker interaction as a Stackelberg game, Bob as the leader chooses his pilot training power, while a full-duplex eavesdropper as the follower determines the pilot contamination power according to the observed Bob’s ongoing training signals transmission. Two equilibriums under different strategy spaces are analyzed. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can defend against an intelligent active eavesdropper with a higher secrecy rate and utility.