Within-group heterogeneity and civil war
Within-group heterogeneity and civil war
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群体内的异质性和内战
DOI：
10.1007/s10101-016-0189-x
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
N. Mizuno and R. Okazawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
山田和芳;瀬戸浩二;永島郁;渡邊隆広;奈良郁子;安田喜憲;菅原和孝;中溝和弥;N. Mizuno and R. Okazawa
这项研究提供了一个谈判模型的冲突中，政府提供了一个转移到反对派团体，以防止内战。反对派成员在收入和意识形态上各不相同，而这种异质性导致了是否接受政府提议的分歧。我们假设，随着反对派成员同意接受政府的提议，政府提议能够避免冲突的概率不断增加。当反对派成员内部异质性较大时，接受政府提议的成员数量对转移水平的增加反应较小。在这种情况下，政府必须大幅增加其转移，以吸引反对派的支持。随后，随着政府为和平付出的代价越来越大，谈判很可能破裂。
This study offers a bargaining model of conflict in which the government offers a transfer to an opposition group to preclude civil war. Members of the opposition are heterogeneous in income and ideology, and heterogeneity generates disagreement about whether to accept the government’s offer. We assume that the probability that the government’s offer will preclude conflict increases continuously with the number of opposition group members who agree to accept it. When within-group heterogeneity is large, the number of members who are receptive to the government’s offer is less responsive to an increase in the transfer level. In this situation, the government must substantially increase its transfer to attract the support of the opposition. Subsequently, as peace becomes more costly for the government, negotiations are likely to break down.