Pre‐emptive production and market competitiveness in oligopoly with private information
Pre‐emptive production and market competitiveness in oligopoly with private information
复制标题
私有信息寡头垄断下的先发制人生产与市场竞争力
DOI：
10.1111/jems.12410
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Nakamura Tomoya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Amemiya Yuki;Ishihara Akifumi;Nakamura Tomoya
我们通过比较古诺竞争和Stackelberg博弈来研究企业的先发制人行为，在这种博弈中，每个企业都可以获得关于随机需求的私人信息。我们发现，当且仅当企业与其他企业相比不知道市场规模时，企业更喜欢先发制人的数量选择(Stackelberg Leader)而不是同时的数量选择(古诺公司)。该公司在生产时机方面的决定总是对该行业的生产者过剩不利。在双寡头竞争中，有利于消费者剩余，但当市场上竞争者较多时，则不利于消费者剩余。
We investigate a firm's pre‐emptive behavior by comparing Cournot competition and Stackelberg games with one leader and multiple followers, where each firm has access to private information on stochastic demand. We show that the firm prefers pre‐emptive quantity choice (Stackelberg leader) to simultaneous quantity choice (Cournot firm) if and only if the firm is ignorant of the market size compared to the other firm. The firm's decision in terms of production timing is always detrimental to producer surplus in the industry. It is beneficial to consumer surplus in duopoly competition, but detrimental when there are many competitors in the market.