INDIVISIBLE LABOR SUPPLY AND INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT: MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION MODEL
INDIVISIBLE LABOR SUPPLY AND INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT: MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION MODEL
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不可分割的劳动力供给和非自愿失业：垄断竞争模式
DOI：
10.1007/s12597-021-00556-y
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
TANAKA YASUHITO
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Naoko Okuyama;Yee Keong Choy;Masao Ogaki;Ayumi Onuma;藤嶋翔太;菊地信義;Yukiko Asai and Dmitri Koustas;TANAKA YASUHITO
本文利用微分对策方法，在一般需求和成本函数下，分析了动态寡头垄断企业降低R&D投资成本的问题。各企业R&D投资的稳态价值随着企业数量的增加而减少。当R&D投资的直接效应大于（小于）溢出效应时，行业R&D投资的稳态值随企业数量的增加而增加（减少）。如果企业的产出是战略替代品，则在给定成本水平的情况下，每个企业的R&D投资随着企业数量的增加而减少。如果不存在R&D投资的溢出效应，并且企业的产出是战略替代（或战略互补），则在给定成本水平的情况下，无记忆闭环解决方案中每个企业的R&D投资大于（小于）开环解决方案中的R&D投资。我们还表明，如果没有R&D投资的溢出效应，一个无记忆的闭环解决方案和反馈解决方案（由Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程）是等价的。
This paper presents an analysis of cost reducing R&D investment in a dynamic oligopoly under general demand and cost functions by differential game approach. The steady state value of the R&D investment by each firm is decreasing in the number of firms. If the direct effect of R&D investment is larger (smaller) than the spillover effect, the steady state value of the industry R&D investment is increasing (decreasing) in the number of firms. If the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes, the R&D investment by each firm given the cost level is decreasing in the number of firms. If there is no spillover effect of R&D investment, and the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes (or strategic complements), the R&D investment of each firm given the cost level in a memoryless closed-loop solution is larger (smaller) than that in an open-loop solution. Also we show that if there is no spillover effect of R&D investment, a memoryless closed-loop solution and a feedback solution (by the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation) are equivalent.