Can prohibitions on "price gouging" reduce deadweight losses?
Can prohibitions on "price gouging" reduce deadweight losses?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.irle.2013.05.001
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发表时间：
2014-03-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Fleck, Robert K.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fleck, Robert K.
关于价格控制的大量文献几乎没有提到反对“价格欺诈”的法律与一般价格上限的区别，但它们之间有一个重要的区别。通过制造可预见的短缺可能性（而不是确定性），禁止哄骗价格可能会导致理性消费者增加消费。这对具有外部效益的市场产生了特别有趣的影响——对政策导致的短缺的预期可能会增加对社会有益的准备，以应对严重短缺（例如，在流行病之前获得疫苗接种，在手头准备应对自然灾害）。因此，在某些情况下，反对哄骗价格的法律可能会增加总剩余。(c) 2013爱思唯尔公司版权所有。
The vast literature on price controls says little about the way laws against "price gouging" differ from generic price ceilings, yet there is an important difference. By creating the foreseeable possibility (not certainty) of a shortage, a prohibition on price gouging may cause rational consumers to increase consumption. This has particularly interesting implications for markets with external benefits - expectations about policy-induced shortages may increase socially beneficial preparedness for times of acute scarcity (e.g., obtaining vaccinations prior to epidemics, keeping goods on hand in preparation for natural disasters). Thus, under some conditions, laws against price gouging may increase total surplus. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.