On the distinction between false belief understanding and subscribing to an interpretive theory of mind
On the distinction between false belief understanding and subscribing to an interpretive theory of mind
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DOI:
10.2307/1131725
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发表时间:
1996-08-01
影响因子:
4.6
通讯作者:
Chandler, MJ
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Carpendale, JI;Chandler, MJ
2 groups of 5-8-year-olds were examined in an effort to explore the developing relations between false belief understanding and an awareness of the individualized nature of personal taste, on the one hand, and, on the other, a maturing grasp of the interpretive character of the knowing process. In Study 1, 20 children between 5 and 8 all behaved in accordance with hypotheses by proving to be indistinguishable in their already good grasp of the possibility of false beliefs and in their common assumption that differences of opinion concerning matters of taste are legitimate expressions of personal preferences. By contrast, only the 7- and 8-year-old children gave evidence of recognizing that ambiguous stimuli especially allow for warrantable differences of interpretation. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings with a group of 48 5-8-year-old subjects, again showing that while 5-year-olds easily pass a standard test of false belief understanding, only children of 7 or 8 ordinarily evidence an appreciation of the interpretive character of the knowing process.