Eroding the Boundaries of Cognition: Implications of Embodiment
Eroding the Boundaries of Cognition: Implications of Embodiment
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01211.x
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发表时间：
2012-10-01
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Chemero, Anthony
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anderson, Michael L.;Richardson, Michael J.;Chemero, Anthony
接受认知是具身的，就是对认知科学家传统上持有的许多信念提出质疑。一个关键的问题是关于认知能力的定位。在这里，我们认为，认知是具体化的，有时嵌入，意味着认知能力不能单独定位在大脑区域。我们回顾了最近关于神经重用、人类活动的1/f结构、工具使用、群体认知和社会协调动态的研究，我们认为这些研究表明大脑不同区域、大脑和身体以及身体和身体之间的边界是如何的。环境不仅模糊，而且不确定。反过来，我们提出，认知是由一个嵌套的结构的任务特定的协同作用，这是软组装从各种神经，身体和环境组件（包括其他个人），并表现出互动占主导地位的动态。
To accept that cognition is embodied is to question many of the beliefs traditionally held by cognitive scientists. One key question regards the localization of cognitive faculties. Here we argue that for cognition to be embodied and sometimes embedded, means that the cognitive faculty cannot be localized in a brain area alone. We review recent research on neural reuse, the 1/f structure of human activity, tool use, group cognition, and social coordination dynamics that we believe demonstrates how the boundary between the different areas of the brain, the brain and body, and the body and environment is not only blurred but indeterminate. In turn, we propose that cognition is supported by a nested structure of task-specific synergies, which are softly assembled from a variety of neural, bodily, and environmental components (including other individuals), and exhibit interaction dominant dynamics.