THE MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS THAT DO NOT LEAVE "TOO MUCH" TO CHANCE'
THE MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS THAT DO NOT LEAVE "TOO MUCH" TO CHANCE'
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操纵社会选择机制，不让机会“太多”
DOI：
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发表时间：
1977
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Barberà
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Barberà
在本文中，我们研究了构建满意的社会选择机制，其结果是由投票和机会的组合决定的可能性。下面的定理得到：如果一个社会选择机制没有留下“太多”的机会，并满足一个随机性条件，那么它要么是一致操纵或独裁。这一结果为Gibbard [2]提出的研究机会起作用的社会选择机制在多大程度上可以摆脱战略操纵的方案提供了依据。
In this paper we study the possibility of constructing satisfactory social choice mechanisms whose outcomes are determined by a combination of voting and chance. The following theorem is obtained: if a social choice mechanism does not leave "too much" to chance and satisfies a unanimity condition, then it is either uniformly manipulable or dictatorial. The result contributes to the program suggested by Gibbard [2] for the study of the extent to which social choice mechanisms in which chance plays a role can be freed from 2 strategic manipulation.