Competitive Behavior-Based Price Discrimination for Software Upgrades
Competitive Behavior-Based Price Discrimination for Software Upgrades
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DOI：
10.1287/isre.1100.0291
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发表时间：
2012-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Amit Mehra;R. Bala;R. Sankaranarayanan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Amit Mehra;R. Bala;R. Sankaranarayanan
在竞争环境中引入产品升级在软件行业中是很常见的。在推出新产品时，软件供应商可能会采用基于行为的价格歧视（BBPD），通过提供高于其市场价格的折扣来吸引竞争对手的现有客户。这种类型的定价称为竞争性升级折扣定价，之所以可行，是因为供应商可以使用竞争对手产品的购买证明作为提供折扣的可靠证据。同时，竞争对手可能会向其以前的客户提供折扣，以诱导他们购买其升级产品。我们制定了一个涉及现有企业和进入者的博弈论模型，其中两家公司都可以向现有企业的现有客户提供折扣。尽管存在多种均衡可能性，但我们确定，只有在独特的市场结构和相应的独特价格组中才能观察到竞争性升级折扣定价的均衡。在这种均衡中，现有企业并没有利用其先发优势，而是将市场份额让给了进入者。此外，现有企业和进入者的利润都会随着转换成本而减少。这意味着 BBPD 的使用具有产品设计意义，因为公司可能通过做出适当的兼容性决策来影响其产品之间的转换成本。此外，较低的转换成本会导致消费者剩余减少。因此，社会规划者可能希望增加转换成本。由此产生的政策影响与移动电信等其他行业普遍存在的政策影响不同，在这些行业中，监管机构通过强制号码可携带来降低转换成本。
The introduction of product upgrades in a competitive environment is commonly observed in the software industry. When introducing a new product, a software vendor may employ behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) by offering a discount over its market price to entice existing customers of the competitor. This type of pricing is referred to as competitive upgrade discount pricing and is possible because the vendor can use proof of purchase of a competitor's product as credible evidence to offer the discount. At the same time, the competitor may offer a discount to its own previous customers in order to induce them to buy its upgrade. We formulate a game-theoretic model involving an incumbent and entrant where both firms can offer discounts to existing customers of the incumbent. Although several equilibrium possibilities exist, we establish that an equilibrium with competitive upgrade discount pricing is observed only for a unique market structure and a corresponding unique set of prices. In this equilibrium, instead of leveraging its first mover advantage, the incumbent cedes market share to the entrant. Furthermore, the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant reduce with switching costs. This implies that the use of BBPD has product design implications because firms may influence the switching costs between their products by making appropriate compatibility decisions. In addition, lower switching costs result in reduced consumer surplus. Hence, a social planner may want to increase switching costs. The resulting policy implications are different from those prevalent in other industries such as mobile telecommunications where the regulators reduced switching costs by enforcing number portability.