Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
复制标题
具有非线性偏好的策略证明机制设计：任意数量对象的事后收入最大化
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-021-01333-y
复制
发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takahiro Hirai;Zingzhao Xia;Shoichiro Katayama;Haruki Nagae;Wanbin Zhang;Kazushi Mashima;Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa
我们考虑多目标分配问题的货币转移，每个代理人获得最多一个对象（单位需求）。我们关注的是满足个人理性、非浪费性、平等对待和防策略性的分配机制。扩展Kazumura et al.（J Econ Theory 188：105036，2020 b）的结果，我们表明，对于任意数量的代理人和对象，最低价格Walrasian是唯一的事后收入最大化机制中的机制满足没有补贴除了四个属性，并且没有补贴在这个结果可以取代没有破产的积极收入效应域。
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.