A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief
A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief
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对信仰的非凡的、性格的描述
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
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通讯作者：
Eric Schwitzgebel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eric Schwitzgebel
本文详细描述并捍卫了一种新颖的信仰解释，这种解释受到赖尔对信仰的性格特征的启发，但强调了不可简化的现象和认知倾向以及行为倾向。考虑了潜在的外在主义和功能主义的反对意见，以及由相关倾向归因不可避免的其他条件不变性质引起的担忧。有人认为，对信仰的倾向性解释特别适合处理所谓的“中间”信仰案例，即既不能完全正确地描述一个人具有特定的信仰，也不能完全正确地描述她缺乏该信仰的情况。
This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.