Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies

Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies
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农业经济中的有限责任、财富差异和租赁合同

DOI:
10.1016/0304-3878(88)90068-5
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发表时间:
1988
影响因子:
5
通讯作者:
S. Shetty
S. Shetty
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Shetty

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对关于租户选择和他们的福利的变化的两个观察提供了解释。当固定租金承诺可能违约时,租户财富的差异意味着相应的责任差异。在这种情况下,房东无法明确房客的努力程度,这就导致了不同合同类型下的努力选择不同。因此,租户的选择和他们获得的合同条款取决于财富,更富有的租户被优先考虑,并获得固定的租金合同。这些结果还预测,较富裕的租户在租赁土地上获得更高的利润。
An explanation is provided for two observations concerning variations in the choice of tenants and their welfare. Differences in tenants' wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible on fixed rental commitments. In this context, the inability of landlords to specify their tenants' effort lead to effort choices that vary with the type of contract offered. The selection of tenants and the contract terms they receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving fixed rent contracts. These results also predict that wealthier tenants earn higher profits on their leased plots.