Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies
Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies
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农业经济中的有限责任、财富差异和租赁合同
DOI:
10.1016/0304-3878(88)90068-5
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发表时间:
1988
影响因子:
5
通讯作者:
S. Shetty
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Shetty
An explanation is provided for two observations concerning variations in the choice of tenants and their welfare. Differences in tenants' wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible on fixed rental commitments. In this context, the inability of landlords to specify their tenants' effort lead to effort choices that vary with the type of contract offered. The selection of tenants and the contract terms they receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving fixed rent contracts. These results also predict that wealthier tenants earn higher profits on their leased plots.