Principal-principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China
Principal-principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China
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DOI：
10.1002/smj.2027
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发表时间：
2013-04-01
影响因子：
8.3
通讯作者：
Qian, Cuili
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li, Jiatao;Qian, Cuili
在1998年至2007年中国上市公司的企业收购背景下，对大股东—大股东视角进行了检验和拓展。目标公司控股股东对潜在收购的抵制反映了大股东和中小股东之间的冲突。研究发现，当目标公司位于制度发展更为完善的地区时，这种抵制会减弱，因为在这些地区中小股东的利益能得到更好的保护。对于首席执行官具有政治关联的目标公司，这种抵制也会降低，因为这些首席执行官可能对自身的政治生涯更感兴趣，而非代表控股股东的利益。版权所有（c）2012约翰威立父子出版公司。
The principal-principal perspective is tested and extended in the context of corporate takeovers of Chinese publicly listed firms from 1998 to 2007. The resistance of a target firm's controlling shareholder toward potential takeovers reflects the conflict between the principal and minority shareholders. It was found that this resistance weakens when target firms are located in regions with more institutional development, where the minority shareholders' interests are better protected. The resistance also decreases for target firms with CEOs who are politically connected, as these CEOs may be more interested in their own political careers than in representing the interests of the controlling shareholders.Copyright (c) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.