Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
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声誉与生存：动态信号模型中的学习
DOI：
10.1111/1467-937x.00243
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Heski Bar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Heski Bar
我们考虑声誉对在离散时间段内销售单一单位的垄断者生存的影响，其质量是慢慢学习的。如果卖家以与顾客相同的速度了解自己的品质，那么运气不佳可能会导致她停止销售。当她知道自己的质量时，一个好的卖家永远不会停止销售，尽管声誉较低的坏卖家有一定的可能性会停止销售。此外，拥有积极（尽管不完美）信息的卖家无论其信息是私人的还是公开的，其销售周期数都是相同的。当卖方的战略行为机会有限时，我们进一步考虑中心结果的稳健性。版权所有 2003，Wiley-Blackwell。
We consider the impact of reputation on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling. When she knows her quality, a good seller never stops selling though at low reputations a bad seller does with some probability. Furthermore, a seller with positive, though imperfect, information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public. We further consider the robustness of the central result when the seller's opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.